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HIV Disclosure Laws are Unjustified 
TONY FICARROTTA* 
I. INTRODUCTION
People living with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) are treated 
differently than other people by the laws of most jurisdictions in the United States. 
With varying degrees of qualification, thirty-two states explicitly criminalize 
people living with HIV (“PLWH”) when they engage in sex, share needles, or 
otherwise expose others to their bodily fluids.1 HIV criminalization laws take 
different forms.2 However, one common form is a statute prohibiting PLWH from 
engaging in sexual activity before disclosing their HIV serostatus to their 
prospective sexual partners (“Disclosure Laws”).3 In jurisdictions with Disclosure 
Laws, PLWH who have sex with otherwise willing partners risk criminal 
sanctions if they do so without first disclosing their serostatus. In general, 
however, the state has no business criminalizing the sex that willing adults 
choose to engage in with each other.4 So what, if anything, justifies states’ use 
of Disclosure Laws to override the liberty and privacy interests PLWH have in 
conducting their sex lives as other willing adults do? 
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1. RASHIDA RICHARDSON ET AL., POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, THE CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY,
ENDING & DEFENDING AGAINST HIV CRIMINALIZATION: A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES: STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS 278, 278 (2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter ENDING & DEFENDING]. 
2. See generally id. at 1-5. 
3. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (West 2015) (prohibiting PLWH who know their 
serostatus from engaging in “sexual penetration” unless they “first [inform] the other person of the 
presence of human immunodeficiency virus”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 2015) (prohibiting 
PLWH who know their serostatus from engaging in “sexual intercourse” with another person “unless 
such other person has been informed of the presence of [HIV] and has consented to the sexual 
intercourse”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (West 2015) (prohibiting PLWH who know their serostatus 
from engaging in sexual activity if they do not “disclose to the other person the fact [of their serostatus] 
prior to [sexual activity]”); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE  41A.0202 (2016) (requiring PLWH to “notify future 
sexual intercourse partners of the infection”); see also generally ENDING & DEFENDING, supra note 1. 
4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”). 
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This Article engages with two potential justifications: (1) that Disclosure 
Laws are justified for public health reasons because they purport to reduce the 
transmission rate of HIV (the “Public Health Justification”); and (2) that 
Disclosure Laws are justified because they promote the sexual autonomy of 
PLWHs’ prospective sex partners, whose consent to sex is impaired without 
knowledge of serostatus (the “Sexual Autonomy Justification”). 
Part II of this Article develops a new argument against the Public Health 
Justification. It begins by surveying facts about HIV to illustrate our current 
understanding of the public health threat that it presents. In light of those facts, it 
reviews the well-known position that Disclosure Laws do not actually reduce the 
rate of HIV transmission. Then, it presents a new general argument against 
Disclosure Laws: regardless of whether Disclosure Laws effectively reduce the rate 
of HIV transmission, they are unjustified in imposing criminal sanctions on PLWH 
because such sanctions are mismatched to conduct that, at worst, constitutes a 
“public welfare offense.” Part II finishes by examining the constitutional 
implications of Disclosure Laws that raise the specter of legislative animus toward 
PLWH when they impose criminal sanctions on them without an adequate public 
health justification. It concludes that while Disclosure Laws are probably not 
unconstitutional under current equal protection “animus” jurisprudence, they 
nevertheless cannot be justified on public health grounds. 
Part III addresses the Sexual Autonomy Rationale. It begins by laying out a 
combination of case law and hypotheticals that illustrate varying degrees of 
impairment to consensual sex. This will create a context for the analysis of the 
degree of impairment presented by a PLWH’s failure to disclose serostatus. From 
there, Part III presents an argument that nondisclosure scenarios do not uniformly 
impair consent to the degree that would justify a general legal duty to disclose, 
such as the one created by many Disclosure Laws. It concludes that many 
Disclosure Laws are too broad to be supported by the Sexual Autonomy 
Justification. 
This Article concludes that because both the Public Health and Sexual 
Autonomy Justifications fail to support broad Disclosure Laws, and no serious 
alternative justifications have been articulated, HIV Disclosure Laws are 
unjustified. 
II. EVALUATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH JUSTIFICATION 
A. The Public Health Threat Posed by HIV 
HIV targets and destroys T cells, which are essential to the functioning of the 
human immune system.5 If HIV destroys enough T cells in an infected person’s 
immune system, that person will be unable to fight off other diseases and 
infections.6 When HIV progresses this way, the infected person develops Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).7 Without treatment, a person with AIDS 
 
 5.  See About HIV/AIDS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/basics/whatishiv.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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may experience a number of serious symptoms, including rapid weight loss, 
extreme fatigue, sores, lesions, and neurological disorders.8 There is presently no 
cure for HIV infection,9 and although not all HIV infections will lead to AIDS, the 
life expectancy for a person living with untreated AIDS is only one to three years.10 
In 1982, the first year the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) used 
the term “AIDS,”11 the annual mortality rate for reported AIDS cases was 41%.12 
Mortality peaked in 1986, when 24,559 of a total of 28,712 reported cases of AIDS 
resulted in death, representing a mortality rate of nearly 86%.13 Since the first 
confirmed cases in 1981, HIV infections have led to over 650,000 deaths in the 
United States and over 30 million deaths globally.14 HIV/AIDS has thus earned 
its reputation as “one of history’s worst pandemics.”15 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is ongoing. There are approximately 1.2 million 
people in the United States currently living with HIV, with about 50,000 new 
HIV diagnoses every year.16 However, the health prospects for PLWH have 
improved dramatically as treatments have advanced. The introduction of highly 
active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) alone led to a 63% decrease in AIDS deaths in 
the United States between 1995 and 1998.17 Presently, HIV is generally considered to be 
a manageable disease: with proper treatment, PLWH can keep the virus under control 
and live relatively healthy lives.18 In fact, as of 2013, a properly-treated twenty-year-
old PLWH in the United States is expected to live into their early seventies, which 
is comparable to the life expectancy of an HIV-negative counterpart.19 
In addition to improved personal health prospects, properly-treated PLWH 
have a reduced risk of transmitting HIV to their sex partners.20 Effective treatment 
 
 8.  HIV/AIDS 101: Symptoms of HIV, AIDS.GOV, https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-
101/signs-and-symptoms/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 9.  About HIV/AIDS, supra note 5. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  HIV/AIDS 101: A Timeline of AIDS, AIDS.GOV, https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hivaids-
101/aids-timeline/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2015). 
 12.  Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) – United States, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP.  507, 507–08 (1982). 
 13.  See Thirty Years of HIV/AIDS: Snapshots of an Epidemic, AM. FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH, 
http://www.amfar.org/thirty-years-of-hiv/aids-snapshots-of-an-epidemic/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2015). 
 14.  Ronald O. Valdiserri, Commentary: Thirty Years of AIDS in America: A Story of Infinite Hope, 23 
AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION, no. 6, 2011, at 479, 479–80; HIV in the United States: At A Glance, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 15.  Kevin M. De Cock et al., Reflections on 30 Years of AIDS, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1044, 
1044 (2011). 
 16.  See Basic Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/basics/statistics.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 17.  See Valdiserri, supra note 14, at 480. 
 18.  Newly Diagnosed: What You Need to Know, AIDS.GOV, https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aidsbasics/ 
just-diagnosed-with-hiv-aids/overview/newly-diagnosed/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2015). 
 19.  CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, ROUTES, RISKS AND REALITIES OF HIV TRANSMISSION AND CARE: 
CURRENT SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND MEDICAL TREATMENT  2 (2015) [hereinafter ROUTES, RISKS, AND 
REALITIES]. 
 20.  Valdiserri, supra note 14, at 481. 
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with HAART, in tandem with condom use, reduces the risk of HIV transmission 
in many circumstances to near-zero.21 Even without the mitigating effects of 
HAART and condom use, HIV transmission rates are lower than one might 
imagine. While the risk of an HIV-negative person contracting HIV from sex with 
a PLWH depends on the PLWH’s viral load and the kind of sex they have, 
transmission risks range, per exposure, from 0% when the PLWH performs fellatio 
on an HIV-negative partner to 1.38% when the PLWH is the insertive partner for 
anal sex (the highest-risk sexual contact for HIV transmission).22 
However, most Disclosure Laws currently on the books were enacted before 
the medical community understood the true routes and risks of HIV transmission 
and before HAART was available to treat HIV infections.23 That fact has led some 
to decry Disclosure Laws as a form of outdated “HIV Criminalization”24 that 
ignores both the medical facts about the routes and risks of HIV transmission and 
the current realities of HIV treatment.25 This raises serious questions about 
whether Disclosure Laws have an adequate public health justification in light of 
our best understanding of the risks associated with HIV. However, in light of the 
fact that HIV is “one of history’s worst pandemics[,]”26 there is a prima facie case 
that states are justified in responding aggressively to combat the pandemic with 
all of their tools and resources, including the coercive power of criminal sanctions. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of considerations that undermine the prima facie 
justification the Public Health Rationale provides for Disclosure Laws. 
B. The Public Health Justification does not Support Disclosure Laws 
One well-developed criticism of Disclosure Laws is that they are simply 
ineffective from a public health perspective.27 And, if they do not effectively reduce 
the rate of HIV transmission, the corresponding burden they place on PLWH to 
disclose their serostatus is hard to justify on public health grounds. Further, there 
is evidence that Disclosure Laws actively undermine efforts to reduce 
transmission rates by creating a disincentive for people to get tested for HIV.28 
Because Disclosure Laws require PLWH to disclose their serostatus to their sexual 
partners only when they know they are HIV-positive, that creates a reason for 
people to avoid knowing their serostatus by foregoing HIV testing. Because 30% 
 
 21.  POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, WHY ARE WE PUTTING PEOPLE IN 
JAIL FOR HAVING HIV? A GRASSROOTS GUIDE TO HIV CRIMINALIZATION: FACTS, FOOLISHNESS 
AND SOLUTIONS 2 (2015) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS GUIDE]. 
 22.  See HIV Risk Behaviors, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/risk/estimates/riskbehaviors.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 23.  POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2012) [hereinafter CONSENSUS STATEMENT]. 
 24.  “HIV Criminalization” is broadly understood as “the prosecution and imprisonment of 
people living with HIV . . . for things that either are [otherwise] perfectly legal (like consensual sex) or 
are minor crimes (like fighting with someone) that are treated like serious felonies when done by 
people living with HIV[.]” GRASSROOTS GUIDE, supra note 21, at 1. 
 25.  CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 23, at 1. 
 26.  De Cock et al., supra note 15, at 1044. 
 27.  See Animus and Sexual Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1767, 1781 (2014). 
 28.  Id. 
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of new HIV infections are transmitted by people who do not know their serostatus, 
any disincentive to get tested could be dangerous and counterproductive.29  Due 
to these considerations, there is broad consensus among public health researchers 
that Disclosure Laws, assuming they are intended to reduce the rate of HIV 
transmission, fail to have their intended effect.30 
However, this kind of criticism of Disclosure Laws is limited in one important 
respect: it leaves open the question of whether Disclosure Laws, when drafted 
differently, or applied in different factual circumstances, might turn out to be 
justified on public health grounds. For example, the disclosure laws of some states 
are sensitive to actual risks of transmission because they require disclosure only if 
the PLWH does not use a condom.31 At least in theory, this deters only the riskiest 
behaviors and promotes condom use. These variations in drafting invite a debate 
about how to widen or narrow the scope of conduct criminalized by Disclosure 
Laws to maximize any public health benefit. Put another way, just because some 
Disclosure Laws are bad in fact does not mean that all Disclosure Laws are bad in 
principle. 
However, a more general criticism of Disclosure Laws is available: states that 
impose criminal sanctions to deter behavior that might lead to HIV transmission 
inappropriately condemn sick people as criminals. According to this criticism, 
even if a state’s use of coercive means to reduce the transmission of HIV were 
effective, criminal sanctions would be an inappropriate mechanism for 
accomplishing that goal. Even carefully crafted Disclosure Laws would still be 
bad in principle to the extent they employ criminal sanctions in reliance on the 
Public Health Justification. This criticism relies on two main premises. First, that 
there is a meaningful distinction between public welfare offenses and common 
law crimes; and second, that the expressive function of criminal punishment (i.e., 
to condemn) is inappropriate for public welfare offenses. 
From a public health perspective, a PLWH’s failure to disclose their 
serostatus is best characterized as a “public welfare offense,” as opposed to a 
classic common law crime.32 According to the United States Supreme Court (the 
“Supreme Court”) in Morissette v. United States, public welfare offenses “result in 
no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger 
or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. . . . [P]enalties commonly 
are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender ’s 
reputation.”33 Paradigm public welfare offenses include regulations for traffic or 
food and drug safety that are not designed to respond to an offender’s 
“conscious wrongdoing” with a punishment, but rather, to protect the public 
from the risk of harm presented by otherwise blameless conduct.34 
 
 29.  HIV Testing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 20, 2016), https://www.cdc. 
gov/hiv/testing/. 
 30.  See Kim Shayo Buchanan, When is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
1231, 1241 n.31 (2015) (collecting public policy evidence that HIV should not be criminalized). 
 31.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2016) (excluding from its scope, among 
other things, fellatio with a condom, which presents only a theoretical risk of transmission). 
 32.  Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952). 
 33.  Id. at 256. 
 34.  See Joseph Edward Kennedy, The Story of Staples v. United States and the Innocent Machine Gun 
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From a public health perspective, a PLWH’s failure to disclose their 
serostatus seems to fit the bill for a public welfare offense because the sexual 
activity they engage in presents their partner with only a risk of HIV transmission, 
and may not result in actual transmission. As noted earlier, different kinds of 
sexual conduct present different risks of HIV transmission, with the riskiest kind 
of sexual contact (i.e., when a PLWH is the insertive partner for penile-anal 
intercourse) presenting the HIV-negative partner with a transmission risk of 
approximately 1.38% per exposure.35 Assuming a PLWH does not in fact transmit 
HIV to their partner (as will be the case, statistically speaking, 98.62% of the time) 
they have not caused any “direct or immediate injury” to their partner, but rather 
have created only the “danger or probability” of harm.36 
As the Supreme Court stated in Morissette, the consequences for committing 
a public welfare offense should be minor relative to common law crimes, and 
commission of such an offense should have no significant effect on an offender’s 
reputation.37 Such consequences may be understood as mere penalties, like the 
requirement to pay a parking ticket, and not as punishments for criminal 
wrongdoing, which are characterized by “hard treatment” by the state, such as 
imprisonment.38 Beyond the difference in severity of the state’s treatment of people 
who commit public welfare offenses and those who commit common law crimes, 
punishment for common law crimes also “[expresses] attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation . . . . Punishment, 
in short, has symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”39 
Whereas the consequences of a public welfare offense represent merely an 
“instrumental response to an instrumental problem,”40 punishment for truly 
criminal offenses is a form of condemnation of the criminal and her conduct.41 The 
Supreme Court has recognized this aspect of criminal punishment even for minor 
crimes like misdemeanors, highlighting the “stigma” of criminal punishment and 
the impact that stigma has on the dignity of the person charged with a crime, 
characterizing criminal punishment as “state-sponsored condemnation.”42 
One might question how weighty the “symbolic” significance of a state 
sanction is, or the importance of its effect on a person’s dignity, when the sanction 
in question may be important to slowing a deadly global pandemic. However, 
even assuming (contrary to fact) that Disclosure Laws were effective at reducing 
HIV transmission rates,43 focusing on the symbolic and dignitary effects of a 
sanction does not mean that the state’s hands are tied. The state’s use of quarantine 
 
Owner: The Good, The Bad and The Dangerous, at 5 (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1596222, 
2010). 
 35.  See HIV Risk Behaviors, Supra note 22. 
 36.  Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 398 (1965) (making a 
distinction between punishment and other kinds of penalties). 
 39.  Id. at 400. 
 40.  Kennedy, supra note 34, at 5. 
 41.  Feinberg, supra note 38, at 403. 
 42.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–76 (2003). 
 43.  See Buchanan, supra note 30. 
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is a prime example. Quarantine conditions could be very similar to detention or 
imprisonment for a criminal offense, and may be rightly characterized as “hard 
treatment” by the state. The key difference is that quarantine lacks the expressive 
force of state condemnation, whereas imprisonment is the conventional way of 
expressing that very condemnation.44 
As an illustration of the difference, consider the case of Laura Skrip, a Yale 
public health student who was quarantined by the state of Connecticut after 
returning from Liberia during the Ebola epidemic of 2014.45 While in Liberia, Ms. 
Skrip had been assisting Liberia’s Health Ministry with its computer systems, and 
had not come into contact with Ebola patients. Further, when she returned to the 
United States, she tested negative for the Ebola virus. Nonetheless, upon her 
return, she was quarantined alone in her apartment for two weeks while a police 
officer patrolled outside her building, a scenario Ms. Skrip described as her “worst 
nightmare . . . [i]t was incredibly hard just getting through that.”46 Because 
Connecticut’s actions exceeded the CDC) guidelines, and because of the harshness 
of her quarantine conditions, Connecticut’s actions were criticized as excessive in 
relation to the risk of Ebola transmission Ms. Skrip posed.47 This kind of “hard 
treatment” at the hands of the state is at least comparably coercive to arrest and 
imprisonment for a criminal offense, but it does not express the state’s 
condemnation for Ms. Skrips’ decision to travel to Liberia, expose herself to a 
heightened risk of Ebola infection, and then return to the United States, exposing 
others to that risk.48 However excessive and unfair it was, Ms. Skrip’s quarantine 
was still merely “an instrumental response to an instrumental problem[.]”49 
An important caveat is needed at this point: this line of argument should not 
be taken to suggest that states ought to consider adopting quarantine, isolation, or 
other coercive programs to control HIV transmission rates in lieu of criminal 
Disclosure Laws. The argument’s only aim is to draw a distinction between two 
aspects of criminal punishment: (1) hard treatment; and (2) the state’s expression 
of condemnation. Regardless of whether any public health program is justified in 
using coercive or “hard” measures, it does not appear to be justified in using the 
second. 
This Part of the Article has developed the argument that, insofar as public 
health is the rationale for Disclosure Laws, criminal sanctions are inappropriate 
because they expresses the state’s condemnation for nondisclosure of serostatus, 
which goes beyond the merely instrumental response that is called for to deal with 
a purely public health threat. 
 
 
 44.  See Feinberg, supra note 38, at 418–19. 
 45.  Sheri Fink, Ebola Crisis Passes, but Questions on Quarantines Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at 
A1. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Cf. Feinberg, supra note 38, at 418–19. 
 49.  Kennedy, supra note 34, at 5. 
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C. Without the Public Health Justification, do Disclosure Laws Violate the 14th 
Amendment? 
We should not overlook the possibility, perhaps even the probability, that 
Disclosure Laws were passed by state legislators that did not simply elide the 
distinction between public welfare offenses and criminal offenses. Instead, they 
may have intended to condemn the conduct of PLWH independent of any public 
health risk presented by their conduct, setting it apart from the sexual conduct of 
others. 
If state legislators did intend to single out PLWH for special condemnation 
and the stigma of criminal punishment because of their HIV serostatus, their 
choice to do so is constitutionally suspect.50 If a state legislature’s purpose in 
passing a Disclosure Law is to condemn and stigmatize PLWH independent of any 
public health reason, that could constitute an impermissible government motive, 
resulting in constitutionally cognizable harm to PLWH prosecuted under a 
Disclosure Law.51 The fact that the sexual activities some Disclosure Laws prohibit 
swing completely free of actual HIV transmission risks supports an inference of 
improper legislative purpose.52 Such an inference is particularly compelling when 
disclosure statutes outlaw sex that does not pose any known risk of transmission, 
for example when a PLWH performs fellatio on an HIV-negative partner who is 
using a condom.53 
However, the fact that animus toward PLWH may have been (or even likely 
was) a driving force behind the passage of Disclosure Laws is probably not enough 
to render those laws unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence on animus. The leading case on animus is Romer v. Evans.54 In Romer, 
the court held that a Colorado state constitutional amendment violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment55 when it prohibited any legislation protecting people 
 
 50.  The idea that the motivation of legislators in passing disclosure laws may not have been 
purely in the interest of public health has been explored elsewhere. Commentators have pointed out 
that “media reports of HIV-infected sexual predators ignited hysteria and rage, creating political 
demand for a legislative response.” Animus and Sexual Regulation, supra note 27 at 1777; see also 
Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1238 (pointing out that “HIV was largely ignored by criminal law until 
well-publicized allegations that black men had infected white women . . . . HIV nondisclosure starts to 
look and feel like a racialized crime that matters most when men do it to women”). 
 51.  See Animus and Sexual Regulation, supra note 27, at 1785. 
 52.  See id. at 1786 (“[T]he criminalization of non-risky activities may impermissibly use 
government powers to advance the moral and emotional prerogatives of the body politic, divorced 
from legitimate health or safety concerns.”). 
 53.  See ROUTES, RISKS, AND REALITIES, supra note 19, at 1. Arkansas’ disclosure law is an example 
of a disclosure law that prohibits this essentially riskless conduct, since it requires disclosure for any 
“sexual intercourse,” including “fellatio,” and has no carve-out for condom use. See ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-14-123 (West 2016). In contrast, California’s disclosure law applies only to sex acts that have more 
than a theoretical risk of HIV transmission, i.e., unprotected vaginal or anal sex. See CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 120291 (1998). 
 54.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 55.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). 
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from discrimination on the basis on sexual orientation.56 The court stated: 
We cannot say that [the Colorado constitutional amendment] is directed to any 
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment 
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to 
legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own 
sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.57 
Without a rational relation to some legitimate government purpose, the court 
made the “inevitable inference” that the amendment was “born of animosity” to 
non-heterosexual people and represented a “bare desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group.”58 It was therefore held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
However, even Disclosure Laws that are insensitive to transmission risk are 
probably not sufficiently similar to the Colorado amendment to fall under the 
Romer holding. While Romer may have expanded the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by providing an example of what counts as impermissible animus, it 
did not change the fundamental test applied to laws that are tied to a legitimate 
purpose: so long as a fundamental right or suspect class is not implicated, laws 
that bear a “rational relation” to that legitimate purpose will be upheld.60 
Because (1) states have a legitimate government interest in protecting public 
health;61 (2) preventing HIV transmission is a public health issue; and (3) the 
purpose of Disclosure Laws is at least ostensibly to prevent HIV transmission, it 
follows that a Romer challenge to Disclosure Laws would likely turn not on 
whether they are directed toward a legitimate government interest (public health), 
but whether they bear a rational relation to that interest. Such a challenge is 
unlikely to fare well. Even if we accept the criticisms of Disclosure Laws discussed 
above (i.e., even if Disclosure Laws fail to reduce transmission rates and instead 
create a disincentive for people to get HIV tests), laws directed at legitimate 
government interests do not run afoul of equal protection just because “the law 
seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale 
for it seems tenuous.”62 Disclosure laws, even if “unwise” and “work[ing] to the 
disadvantage” of PLWH, still bear a rational relation to the public health.63 A 
factual relation is not required. 
Even if they are not constitutionally defective, this Part of the Article has 
argued that criminal Disclosure Laws are not supported by the Public Health 
Justification because (1) as a matter of fact, they do not reduce the rate of HIV 
transmission; and (2) even if they did reduce transmission rates, they mismatch 
condemnatory criminal sanctions with what is, at worst, a public welfare offense. 
 
 
 56.  See Romer, 517 at 624. 
 57.  Id. at 635. 
 58.  Id. at 634 (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 59.  Id. at 635. 
 60.  See id. at 631. 
 61.  See Castaways Backwater Café, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulations Div. of 
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 214 Fed. Appx. 955, 956 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 62.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 63.  See id. at 635. 
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This Article turns now to a different rationale for Disclosure Laws, which 
may offer a form of justification independent from public health. 
III. EVALUATING THE SEXUAL AUTONOMY JUSTIFICATION 
Even if the Public Health Justification fails to justify some Disclosure Laws as 
they stand (as it appears to do), there is another justification on offer. The idea 
underpinning the Sexual Autonomy Justification is that when a PLWH discloses 
their serostatus, they promote the sexual autonomy of their potential sex partners 
by promoting informed consent; but when they fail to disclose, they impair the 
sexual autonomy of their partners by undermining their informed consent. In 
short, the Sexual Autonomy Justification gets off the ground by recognizing that 
disclosure of serostatus promotes effective and informed consent. This is not an 
original observation: In When is HIV a Crime?,64 Kim Shayo Buchanan undertook a 
thorough and lucid analysis of the Sexual Autonomy Justification and laid 
important groundwork for the analysis undertaken in this Part of the Article. And, 
while this Part draws on some of her insights, it also departs from some of her 
conclusions, as explained later. 
The main issue raised by the Sexual Autonomy Justification – informed 
consent – is illustrated by the following scenario: Taylor and Peyton meet at a party 
and, after some flirtation, they leave together. When they are alone, their contact 
grows more intimate, and as it does, they communicate openly about what they 
are doing and what they are going to do next. Taylor and Peyton are, so far, a 
model for robustly consensual sex. However, unbeknownst to Peyton, Taylor is 
HIV-positive. Further, assume that if Peyton knew Taylor’s serostatus, Peyton 
would have disengaged from sex with Taylor, and would not have consented to 
any further sexual contact. Nonetheless, Taylor does not disclose their serostatus 
and the pair ends up having sex. To better isolate the issue, assume also that Taylor 
did not transmit HIV to Peyton. Nonetheless, Peyton’s sexual autonomy is 
impaired in this scenario because their consent was not fully informed. In some 
sense, Peyton did not consent to the kind of sex they ended up having with Taylor, 
i.e., sex with a PLWH. 
But does the impairment of Peyton’s sexual autonomy in the above scenario 
justify criminal sanctions against Taylor for failure to disclose their serostatus? The 
answer to this question could be independent of the Public Health Justification for 
Disclosure Laws, since competent adults should be free to grant or withhold their 
consent to sex for any reason, or no reason. Even if Taylor posed no meaningful 
risk of transmission to Peyton, Peyton would still be entitled to withhold consent 
based on Taylor’s serostatus. So when Taylor does not provide Peyton the 
opportunity to do so, Taylor has arguably impaired Peyton’s consent. Notice, 
however, that when one person pursues sex with another person whose consent 
is in some way impaired, there are different ways to characterize that conduct 
based on the severity of impairment. When consent is absent from the start, or 
completely vitiated by fraud or misinformation, it constitutes rape or sexual 
assault. However, consent can also be impaired to varying degrees by a lack of 
information that at least seems to fall short of rape. No consent can be perfectly 
 
 64.  See Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1262–94. 
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informed, and, depending on the kind of undisclosed fact at issue, later learning a 
fact about a sexual partner of which one was initially unaware might lead to regret, 
anger, resentment, disgust, and a range of other feelings. Further, if the non-
disclosing partner knew, or should have known, that the undisclosed fact was 
material to consent-in-fact, they are a deserving target of those feelings. But the 
lack of perfectly informed consent does not necessarily vitiate consent, and hence 
might not constitute rape or sexual assault in all cases. 
A pair of cases from the Canadian High Court illustrate some of the 
difficulties raised by trying to draw the line between impaired consent and sexual 
assault for serostatus. First, in R. v. Cuerrier.65 the accused was an HIV-positive 
man who was instructed by his health care providers to always use condoms 
during sexual intercourse and to disclose his serostatus to his potential sexual 
partners.66 Notwithstanding his health care providers’ instructions, he had sex 
with the complainants without using a condom and without disclosing his 
serostatus.67 The complainants testified that, had they known of the accused’s 
serostatus, they would not have consented to the sex they had with him, i.e. 
unprotected intercourse.68 Fortunately, and despite having unprotected sex, the 
accused did not transmit HIV to the complainants.69 Nonetheless, the accused’s 
failure to disclose his serostatus led to charges of sexual assault against him. 
An essential element of the charge was that the sex the accused had with the 
complainants was “without the consent of the complainants.”70 Under Canadian 
law, consent to sex can be vitiated by fraud. Therefore, if the accused obtained 
consent through fraud, he could be guilty of sexual assault.71 The driving question, 
then, is whether the accused’s failure to disclose his serostatus worked a fraud on 
the complainants. To answer that question, the court turned to “principles which 
have historically been applied in relation to fraud,” especially those in commercial 
criminal fraud, such as “dishonesty, which can include non-disclosure of 
important facts.”72 The court concluded that failure to disclose serostatus “is a type 
of fraud which may vitiate consent to sexual intercourse . . . . Without disclosure 
of HIV status there cannot be a true consent. The consent cannot simply be to have 
sexual intercourse. Rather, it must be consent to have intercourse with a partner 
who is HIV-positive.”73 
The view thus expressed by the Cuerrier court represents a strong view about 
the significance of nondisclosure. A weaker view might have resulted in a holding 
that outright lying or deception about serostatus is required to constitute fraud 
capable of vitiating consent. Under the weaker view, if an individual cares enough 
to specifically ask her sex partner about serostatus, there is an obvious inference 
to the materiality of that fact to her decision to consent to sex. But in Cuerrier, the 
 
 65.  R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (Can.). 
 66.  See id. at 371. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  Id. at 372. 
 73.  Id. 
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fact that the accused did not volunteer his serostatus before having sex with the 
complainants – even though they didn’t ask about it or insist on condom use – was 
sufficient for a finding that the complainant obtained their consent through fraud. 
However, the Cuerrier court qualified its conclusion by reminding us of the general 
principle that the “nature and extent of the duty to disclose, if any, will always 
have to be considered in the context of the particular facts presented.”74 
Indeed, an application of that principle led to a different outcome in the 
second Canadian case we will consider. R. v. Mabior also involved an HIV-positive 
man who did not disclose his serostatus before having sex with the complainants.75 
Also like in Cuerrier, the accused did not actually transmit HIV to any of the 
complainants.76 In Mabior, however, unlike in Cuerrier, the accused was found to 
be (1) undergoing antiretroviral therapy; (2) to have undetectable viral loads; and 
(3) to have used a condom with at least some of the complainants.77 Based on those 
findings, the court held that there was no fraud vitiating consent to sex, because 
the accused did not expose the complainants to “a realistic possibility of 
transmission of HIV,” and hence did not expose them to “a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm.”78 
The approach the court took in Mabior seems more sensible, at least from a 
public health perspective. In particular, and unlike many Disclosure Laws, it 
employed a framework that is sensitive to the actual risk of HIV transmission 
presented when a PLWH has sex without disclosing their serostatus to a partner. 
However, as the Mabior court recognized, this approach raises some thorny 
problems of its own: using a fact-specific approach makes the criminality of certain 
conduct “uncertain, failing to draw a clear line between criminal and noncriminal 
conduct[.]”79 We can imagine the kinds of questions future prosecutions based on 
nondisclosure will invite in Canadian courts: what result if an accused’s viral load 
is detectable, but he still used a condom? What result if the accused did not use a 
condom, but the complainant was using preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP)?80 The 
result in these and many other scenarios is unclear from the Mabior holding. While 
recognizing that the framework may be difficult to apply, the court still endorsed 
the “wisdom of the common law that not every deception that leads to sexual 
intercourse should be criminalized, while still according consent meaningful 
scope.”81 To define this “meaningful scope,” the Mabior court identified two 
elements that, in tandem, are sufficient for vitiating consent in HIV-nondisclosure 
cases: (1) a dishonest act (i.e., failure to disclose) that (2) deprives the complainant 
knowledge which would have led to withdrawal of consent to an act that exposed 
the complainant to a significant risk of bodily harm.82 That leaves it for the fact finder 
 
 74.  Id. at 373. 
 75.  See R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 585 (Can.). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 584–85. 
 78.  Id. at 586. 
 79.  Id. at 585. 
 80.  See Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), AIDS.GOV, https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/ 
prevention/reduce-your-risk/pre-exposure-prophylaxis/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
 81.   Mabior, [2012] S.C.R. at 586. 
 82.  Id. at 585 (emphasis added). 
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to decide whether the complainant was exposed to a “significant risk” of bodily 
harm. Depending on the instincts of the judge or jury, as the case may be, we are 
left wondering what non-zero chance is high enough to count as significant. 
Should it be 0.01%? Or 1.0%? 
There are further limitations to the “bodily harm” approach employed by the 
Mabior court. First, it does not square with paradigm cases where the criminal law 
has long recognized “rape by deception.”83 Indeed, there are only two long-
recognized circumstances where lack of informed consent constitutes rape: 
impersonation of a spouse and therapeutic fraud.84 Neither necessarily involves a 
significant risk of bodily harm of the kind contemplated by the Mabior court (e.g., 
disease transmission). 
Arizona provides an example of a spousal deception law. It makes it a crime 
for a person to have sex with someone when “the victim is intentionally deceived 
to erroneously believe that the person is the victim’s spouse.”85 Colorado law 
provides an example of a therapeutic deception (generally understood as 
“deceiving a victim by purporting to engage in a sexual act for therapeutic 
reasons”),86 stating “[a]ny actor who knowingly inflicts sexual penetration or 
sexual intrusion on a victim commits aggravated sexual assault on a client if . . . 
the actor is a psychotherapist and the victim is a client and the sexual penetration 
or intrusion occurred by means of therapeutic deception.”87 
 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1273. 
 84.  See id.; see also generally John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of 
the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1133–41 (2011). 
 85.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(A)(7)(d) (2015). See also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18-3-402(1)(c) (West 2015) (“Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration 
on a victim commits sexual assault [if the] actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, 
believing the actor to be the victim’s spouse[.]”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2907.03(A)(4) (West 
2015) (“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another [when] the offender knows that 
the other person submits because the other person mistakenly identifies the offender as the other 
person’s spouse.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) (West 2015) (“An act of sexual intercourse 
. . . is without consent of the victim [when] the actor knows that the victim submits or 
participates because the victim erroneously believes that the actor is the victim’s spouse[.]”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (West 2015) (“Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim commits sexual assault . . . if . . . The actor knows or should reasonably know that the 
victim submits erroneously believing the actor to be the victim’s spouse[.]”). 
 86.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 84, at 1139. 
 87.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405.5(1)(a)(II). See also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) 
(West 2015) (“A person who is an actual or purported practitioner of psychotherapy commits 
sexual assault when he or she engages in sexual contact with another individual who the actor 
knew or should have known is the subject of the actor’s actual or purported treatment or 
counseling or the actor uses the treatment or counseling relationship to facilitate sexual contact 
between the actor and such individual.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(j) (West 2015) (“A 
person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual 
conduct [if] the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and 
the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception.”). 
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Both spousal deception and therapeutic deception differ from the serostatus 
nondisclosure issues the Canadian high court grappled with in Cuerrier and 
Mabior, because neither kind of deception necessarily involves significant risk 
bodily harm, at least as the Mabior court understood the term. Rather, the issues 
are identity of the sexual partner (spousal deception) and nature or purpose of the 
sexual contact (therapeutic deception). When unscrupulous people deceive their 
way into sexual contact with their victims by pretending to be someone they are 
not, or by using their position of authority or as a caregiver as pretext, the kind of 
harm they do may be primarily to the dignity and autonomy of their victims. 
Autonomous persons get to choose who gets access to their bodies and for what 
purpose. It is not necessary to risk some further, independent bodily harm, like the 
transmission of disease, for consent to be destroyed. 
Buchanan points out, however, that these narrow exceptions for fraud 
vitiating consent in American jurisprudence exist against a backdrop where there 
is no requirement that consent to have sex be informed, and where obtaining sex 
by deception is not generally considered a crime.88 Buchanan lists “age, health, 
fertility, wealth, ethnicity, employment, feelings, intentions, fidelity, [and] marital 
status” as examples of things people can fail to disclose, or even actively deceive 
about, and commit no crime in most United States jurisdictions.89 Nonetheless, 
these are facts about a person one might consider material when deciding whether 
to have sex with them. Acknowledging that these facts are not usually considered 
to vitiate informed consent, we can ask for purposes of developing the Sexual 
Autonomy Justification: should they be so recognized? 
After all, some of the examples Buchanan lays out are deceptions involving 
very important facts that may be material to consent-in-fact. Take marital status, 
for example. Returning to Taylor and Peyton, suppose instead that the fact Taylor 
kept private was not serostatus, but marital status. In this scenario, suppose 
Peyton is single and joined a dating website with the intention of finding a long-
term relationship with a mutually-monogamous partner. Peyton clearly 
represents this intention on their profile, and avoids those who do not share that 
intention. Now enter Taylor. In this scenario, Taylor is monogamously married, 
but surreptitiously seeks sex partners on the same dating website that Peyton 
joined. Taylor finds Peyton’s profile, and, impressed with their picture, messages 
them to ask for a date. Taylor understands perfectly well the kind of partner 
Peyton is seeking, but nonetheless deceives Peyton into thinking they are also 
seeking a monogamous, long-term relationship. After a few pleasant dates, Taylor 
and Peyton have sex. But afterwards, Taylor withdraws from the courtship and 
Peyton never hears from them again. Peyton is disappointed, and thinks that 
Taylor is a jerk. However, Peyton never directly asked after Taylor’s marital status 
and Taylor never volunteered it (i.e., Taylor “failed to disclose” their marital 
status). But if Peyton had known Taylor’s marital status, Peyton never would have 
agreed to sex.  Taylor’s marital status was therefore material to Peyton’s consent. 
Further, Taylor believed that it was material to Peyton when they chose not to 
disclose it (they saw Peyton’s profile, after all). Notwithstanding the fact that this 
kind of conduct is not considered “rape by deception” in U.S. jurisdictions, 
 
 88.  See Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1274. 
 89.  See id. 
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Taylor’s failure to disclose their marital status still impaired Peyton’s sexual 
autonomy to some degree. As the Cuerrier court might have put it, this is a case of 
“non-disclosure of important facts.”90 Peyton’s consent was not fully informed 
because Taylor deceived Peyton by withholding a fact known to be material, and 
Taylor is therefore, at least, a culpable jerk. All of that said, are we prepared to say 
further that Taylor should be subject to criminal liability for sexual assault? 
To help us approach that question, we have before us a number of data 
points: Canadian courts have held that nondisclosure of an important fact, when 
accompanied by significant risk of bodily harm, is enough for a legally cognizable 
harm to consent. In U.S. jurisdictions, bodily harm is not necessary, but some facts 
are more important than others: identity of a sex partner and purpose of sexual 
contact are important enough facts standing alone, while marital status is not. The 
best explanation for these data points must be something more general than risk 
of significant bodily harm (or it fails to capture, e.g., spousal impersonation), but 
also specific enough to capture nuanced distinctions between “important fact” 
scenarios. Spousal impersonation, intuitively, does not only impair sexual 
autonomy, but straightforwardly vitiates consent resulting in sexual assault; but 
failure to disclose marital status, while involving an important fact, may not 
entirely vitiate consent. 
One way to explain these data points and to capture the nuanced distinctions 
missed by the Canadian “bodily harm” criteria is to acknowledge that, although a 
fact may be material to consent-in-fact, some such facts are more subjective and 
others are more objective. Subjectively, one might have a laundry list of 
“dealbreakers”91 that, while personally important, are both impossible and 
inappropriate for the law to attempt to cope with. It would be difficult to justify a 
view that the police should get involved after you learn that your most recent sex 
partner failed to disclose the fact that they belong to your dis-preferred political 
party, although that has always been a “dealbreaker” for you. Even if this partner 
knew it was a dealbreaker, and failed to disclose in light of that knowledge, it is 
hard to believe this crosses the line from culpable to criminal. 
Without trivializing the potential seriousness of failure to disclose serostatus, 
this Part has discussed a spectrum of scenarios involving failure to disclose facts 
ranging from more subjective (political affiliation of a partner) to much more 
objective (identity, as with spousal impersonation). On the subjective extreme, we 
doubt that the level of impairment to consent, though subjectively material, 
outright vitiates consent; while on the objective extreme, there are particularly 
egregious examples like spousal impersonation where the impairment to consent 
is complete. That said, we may not know exactly where to place marital status: it 
is certainly an important fact that many people would find material to consent-in-
fact, but failure to disclose it does not seem to rise to the level of sexual assault. 
With this spectrum in mind, and before turning to serostatus’s place on it, 
this Part of the Article will explore one more important class of disclosure cases: 
contraceptive frauds.  In cases of contraceptive fraud, one sex partner represents 
to the other that effective contraceptive measures like condom use, hormonal birth 
 
 90.  R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 372 (Can.). 
 91.  Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1263. 
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control, vasectomy, or tubal ligation have been taken when in fact they have not.92 
These sorts of cases can have profound, life-altering consequences for any sex 
partners capable of conception. 
In Stephen K. v. Roni L., for example, the defendant in a paternity action cross-
claimed for damages, claiming that the child’s mother had secured his consent to 
have unprotected sex by fraudulently representing that she was on hormonal birth 
control.93 The court held that the mother was not liable for damages, explaining 
that if the court were to “supervise the promises made between two consenting 
adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct [it would] encourage 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual’s right 
to privacy.”94 The court also took pains to point out that hormonal birth control is 
not “100 percent effective” and that the defendant could have taken further 
precautions (like condom use) himself.95 
The facts of Stephen K. v. Roni L. involve a woman deceiving her male partner, 
but contraceptive fraud is equally a problem for women who are deceived by male 
partners. There are cases involving men surreptitiously removing condoms during 
intercourse, intentionally poking secret holes in condoms while representing that 
they were using the condom properly, or simply lying about their fertility.96 An 
unplanned pregnancy resulting from such deceit could lead at least to a 
“distressful life and future,”97 but also to life-threatening complications. 
In Barbara A. v. John G., for example, the plaintiff at first insisted on condom 
use to prevent pregnancy before having sex with the defendant, but after the 
defendant assured her he “couldn’t possibly get anyone pregnant,” she 
acquiesced.98 The defendant’s representation was false, and the plaintiff suffered 
an ectopic pregnancy, which she had to undergo surgery to resolve.99 While the 
surgery saved her life, it also left her sterile.100 The court held that the plaintiff had 
stated a cause of action for sexual battery because her consent to the intercourse 
was fraudulently induced.101 
The contraceptive fraud cases are particularly illuminating because, like the 
Canadian serostatus cases, their outcomes are not entirely consistent. There was 
no liability in Stephen K. v. Roni L.,102 but there was in Barbara A. v. John G.103 While 
the circumstances of the cases were different in important ways, the fact is still that 
 
 
 92.  See id. at 1285. 
 93.  See 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 618–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 94.  Id. at 620. 
 95.  Id. at 621. 
 96.  See Nickeitta Leung, Comment, Education Not Handcuffs: A Response to Proposals for the 
Criminalization of Birth Control Sabotage, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
146, 152 (2015). 
 97.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 98.  193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 103.  193 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
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contraceptive fraud was found capable of vitiating consent in one case, but not the 
other. 
Aided by the context provided by the cases and scenarios discussed above, 
we begin to get a better sense of where serostatus might lie along a spectrum of 
subjective vs. objective materiality for purposes of informed consent. Consider the 
following chart: 
Materiality 
Subjective                                                                                           Objective 
 
 
Political Affiliation| Marital Status | Gender104| Contraception | Purpose | Identity 
 
This spectrum is intended to be illustrative only, and the author is not 
committed to its precise shape. For example, it is possible that the purpose of 
sexual contact is more objective than the identity of the person with whom you 
are having sexual contact. Or maybe they are tied. Nonetheless, contraceptive use 
is almost certainly more objective than political affiliation. So with the basic shape 
of this spectrum in mind, where should serostatus fall along it? 
Serostatus seems, at first blush, to be most akin to contraceptive use, which 
would place it on the more objective end of the spectrum. Serostatus and 
contraceptive use share several important features. First, they both involve only a 
risk of an adverse outcome.105 The problem in both cases is not necessarily that the 
sexual contact itself actually leads to an adverse outcome (e.g., an unwanted 
pregnancy, or an HIV infection), but that one party was denied information the 
other party held, and hence could not deliberate about the importance of the risks 
before consenting. There is a degree of moral luck106 involved in both as well: in 
Barbara A. v. John G., the outcome would likely have been different if the plaintiff 
had not become pregnant as a result of her encounter with the defendant. 
Similarly, the importance of failing to disclose serostatus may be tied to whether 
HIV transmission actually occurs. Further, when the adverse outcome being risked 
is realized, it is highly consequential. 
 
 
 104.  Depressingly, though not surprisingly, the gender cases deal not with cases where, e.g., a man 
fraudulently induces a homosexual woman to have sex with him by pretending to be a woman, but 
instead with cases where cisgender individuals regretted that their sex partners, while of their 
preferred gender, turned out to be transgender. See generally Aeyal Gross, Gender Outlaws Before the 
Law: The Courts of the Borderland, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 165 (2009) (reviewing prosecutions of 
transgender people in various jurisdictions). 
 105.  This is unlike spousal impersonation, since, presumably, the fact of having sex with someone 
other than your spouse under those circumstances is itself the harm. There need not be any risk of a 
further adverse outcome. 
 106.  Dana Nelkin, Moral Luck, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., Apr. 10, 2013,  https://plato.stan 
ford.edu/entries/moral-luck/ (“Moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of 
moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors 
beyond her control.”) Here, whether sexual contact leads to pregnancy, or transmission of an STI, is 
ultimately outside the actors’ control. 
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For example, while HIV infection is no longer a “death sentence,”107 it is still 
a chronic and serious health condition that may be life-altering socially, 
economically, sexually, and otherwise. The gravity of the outcome will also 
depend on the characteristics of the person who contracts HIV. A person of 
relatively high socio-economic status, education, and access to quality health care 
may suffer far fewer consequences from an HIV infection than someone without 
those benefits. Despite how far treatment has come, without access to proper 
treatment, HIV infection is far more likely to result in AIDS, and in some cases, 
may still be fatal. 
Pregnancy is also highly consequential. Particularly if the pregnancy is 
unwanted (as will almost certainly be the case for one party in cases of 
contraceptive fraud), those consequences may be predominantly negative. 
Pregnancy and child-rearing can have long-term repercussions to health, economics, 
social status, and myriad other aspects of life. The gravity of these consequences 
also depends greatly on the characteristics of the person who becomes pregnant 
and/or raises any resulting children: access to healthcare, access to timely 
abortion (if desired), and many other factors will affect the consequences of an 
unwanted pregnancy. As Barbara A. v. John G. illustrated, the health consequences 
of a complicated pregnancy can be up-to and including death. 
There is yet another important way that failure to disclose serostatus is akin 
to contraceptive fraud: the un-disclosed-to-party still retains a degree of control 
over the kinds of risks they are exposed to. As the court in Stephen K. v. Roni L. 
pointed out, the deceived father could have “taken any precautionary measures” 
of his own to prevent pregnancy instead of relying solely on his sex partner.108 
Similarly, it is not clear why the onus, in the eyes of the law, should not be on the 
party that is concerned about HIV transmission (or other sexually transmitted 
infections) to insist on condom use in some circumstances. 
In sum, deception (either through failure to disclose or outright lying) about 
both use of contraception and serostatus present variable risks of an adverse 
outcome, and that outcome, if realized, is often highly consequential. However, 
presuming both parties are otherwise competent and consenting adults, both 
parties retain a degree of control over the risks they are exposed to. 
One further point on degree of control. In view of the evolution of sexual 
mores in the United States, especially the norms of contemporary “hookup 
culture,”109 it is not clear that anyone should simply assume their partner’s 
serostatus in lieu of a definitive disclosure, to say nothing of other sexually 
transmitted infections, use of contraception, marital status, or any number of other 
possibly material facts that inform robust consent. The “rise of casual sex” means 
that sex partners tend to 
“know a lot less about each other than in the past,” with “sex outside of 
relationships and [within] concurrent relations . . . becoming normalized. . . . 
[P]eople now do not know their sexual partners as well and have scant relational 
repercussions to fear if unfortunate discoveries are made the morning after – or a 
 
 107.  Animus and Sexual Regulation, supra note 27, at 1781. 
 108.  164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 109.  See Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual Consent, 12 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 15 (2012). 
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few months after . . . The traditional constraint of relational or social repercussions 
is thus dramatically diminished.110 
At least in a “hookup culture” thus described, waiting for a sex partner to 
disclose serostatus, or volunteer contraception, may not be the prudent choice.111 
At least for cases of pure non-disclosure (as opposed to active deception or 
lying), sexual mores and norms may play a role in what facts are assumed to be 
material to consent-in-fact. These norms could work to shift the burden of 
disclosure, such that the party to whom, for example, contraceptive use, 
serostatuts, marital status, or gender are material must affirmatively inquire 
about them, as they would not be entitled to an expectation of disclosure of those 
facts. 
Given the concurrence of variable risks, moral luck, outsized consequences, 
and shared responsibility discussed above, it is not surprising that courts have 
struggled with uniformity when dealing with the nuances of both serostatus 
nondisclosure and contraceptive fraud. It is also evidence that they are akin in 
how objective the materiality of serostatus and contraceptive use are for purposes 
of consent to sex. Without committing to a definitive ranking on the spectrum 
above, use of contraception and disclosure of serostatus do seem to be in the same 
“neighborhood” of objectivity. A fact like political affiliation is intuitively less 
objective than both, while identity and purpose are more objective. However, it 
is still not clear whether the neighborhood of objectivity they both inhabit is 
objective enough to vitiate consent to sex in the eyes of the criminal law in every 
case, as it is with purpose and identity. 
Buchanan has also grappled with some of these nuances, and, faced with the 
apparent inconsistencies in what kinds of deception vitiate consent as a matter of 
law under the current regime,112 concludes that concerns about sexual autonomy 
cannot explain Disclosure Laws.113 If sexual autonomy is what state legislators cared 
about, Buchanan notes, they would have also criminalized the many other forms 
of deception that similarly impair consent, some of which are discussed above.114 
She concludes that, in light of these inconsistencies, the best approach would be to 
“ratchet down” Disclosure Laws, resulting in decriminalization of serostatus 
nondisclosure and making it akin, from a legal perspective, to nondisclosure of 
marital status or political affiliation.115 However, the discussion above shows that 
different kinds of sexual deception inhabit different levels of objectivity. As such, 
there is reason to believe that some, though not all of them, could support a legal 
 
 110.  Id. at 16–18. 
 111.  Unfortunately, many people do not have the power to insist on the use of prophylaxis or 
contraception, especially victims of domestic violence. See generally Leung, supra note 96, at 146–47. 
Relatedly, vulnerable populations, including victims of domestic violence and sex workers, may not be 
at liberty to safely disclose their serostatus, even if required to do so by law. See generally Buchanan, 
supra note 30, at 1257. 
 112.  See Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1274 (pointing out, e.g., that some states prohibit spousal 
impersonation, but not any other form of intimate partner impersonation). 
 113.  See id. at 1276. 
 114.  Id. (arguing “a rape law whose primary objective was to vindicate sexual autonomy ‘would 
not limit rape-by-deception cases to the two old scenarios’”). 
 115.  Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1338–42. 
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duty to disclose. It is not clear, as Buchanan suggests, that one size should fit all. 
While it may not be plausible to “ratchet up” marital status non-disclosure, for 
example, it is more plausible to “ratchet up” contraceptive fraud because the 
materiality of contraceptive use is more objective. 
So is Buchanan’s “ratchet down” approach the right one for Disclosure Laws, 
or is the materiality of serostatus objective enough to support a broad duty to 
disclose? 
To answer that question, we first recognize that for many people, serostatus 
is material to consent-in-fact. For those people, a PLWH’s failure to disclose 
serostatus will impair their sexual autonomy because they would not have 
consented to sex had they known the PLWH’s serostatuts. 
Nonetheless, the impairment to consent caused by nondisclosure in those 
circumstances does not appear to justify broad Disclosure Laws. For whether the 
Sexual Autonomy Justification supports broad Disclosure Laws turns on the level 
of objectivity of serostatus to the extent it is material for consent-in-fact. If 
serostatus were a consideration as highly objective as identity (spousal 
impersonation) or nature or purpose of sexual contact (therapeutic fraud), the 
broad Disclosure Laws currently on the books in many states would have a 
plausible justification grounded in sexual autonomy. It would, in those 
circumstances, be sensible to make serostatus material to consent as a matter of 
law. 
Serostatus, however, does not seem to be as objectively material to consent as 
identity.  Rather, as discussed above, it seems to be most closely akin to 
contraceptive fraud, as both are characterized by an admixture of variable risks, 
outsized consequences, shared responsibility, and moral luck. And, unlike spousal 
impersonation and therapeutic fraud, nothing about the sexual contact itself is 
necessarily harmful. Rather, it is the risks and uncertainties related to the 
consequences of the sexual contact (e.g., an unwanted pregnancy, or an HIV 
infection). But these characteristics make both contraceptive fraud and serostatus 
nondisclosure poor candidates for materiality as a matter of law because the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case are too important for a blanket 
disclosure requirement to make sense. 
For example, suppose a male PLWH who is (1) undergoing HAART; (2) has 
an undetectable viral load; and (3) is properly using a condom, has intercourse 
with an HIV-negative woman without disclosing his serostatus. Nonetheless, for 
his partner, HIV-positive serostatus is still a “dealbreaker.” Suppose further that, 
from past experience where he had disclosed serostatus, he believes that his 
serostatus will be material to his partner’s consent-in-fact. By failing to disclose his 
serostatus in these circumstances, he has impaired his partner’s sexual autonomy, 
because he did not disclose information he believed to be, and was, material to her 
consent to sex. However, in these circumstances, the materiality of his serostatus 
to his partner’s consent does not appear to be objective enough to warrant 
materiality as a matter of law, because the actual risk of HIV transmission in that 
scenario is practically non-existent.116 This is not to say that the HIV-negative 
partner in this scenario is not entitled to her estimation of serostatus as a 
“dealbreaker”: again, autonomous people are free to withhold their consent for 
 
 116.  See supra § II.A. 
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any reason, or no reason. It is just to say that the PLWH in this scenario may not 
have crossed the line from some amount of moral culpability for impairing his 
partner’s fully informed consent, to legal liability for sexual assault. 
In contrast, a similar kind of sexual encounter takes on a very different 
character if the facts and circumstances surrounding the encounter are different. 
Suppose instead that a PLWH has not received consistent treatment; does not 
know his viral load; does not use a condom with his partner; and that they engage 
in anal intercourse. In these circumstances, the risk of transmission may be up to 
1.4%.117 While this may sound like a relatively low risk of transmission (or may 
not, depending on your perspective), the materiality of serostatus to the HIV-
negative partner is more objective than in the first scenario above because there is a 
real risk of transmission. Further, if the HIV-negative partner does not have access 
to quality healthcare, the health consequences of acquiring an HIV infection could 
be dire. Without committing to the position that failing to disclose serostatus in 
this scenario completely vitiates consent, it is more plausible that a disclosure law 
narrowly tailored to just this kind of scenario could be justified by sexual 
autonomy considerations. 
Disclosure Laws, however, are generally not so carefully tailored.  They are 
overbroad when they cover very-low and essentially no-risk conduct because the 
materiality of that conduct to consent is too subjective. Therefore, broad Disclosure 
Laws are not fully supported by the Sexual Autonomy Justification. It may be 
possible for carefully crafted statutes to stay within the bounds of the Sexual 
Autonomy Justification, but even a narrowly tailored statute should be 
approached skeptically because the particular facts of each scenario matter. 
Without going as far as Buchanan, who concludes that Disclosure Laws do not 
promote “any legitimate interest in . . . sexual autonomy,”118 the analysis in this 
section shows that, while serostatus nondisclosure does implicate sexual 
autonomy concerns, broad Disclosure Laws are not fully justified by those 
concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The two leading rationales for Disclosure Laws, the Public Health 
Justification and the Sexual Autonomy Justification, both fail to support broad 
Disclosure Laws in their current form. The first justification fails for two reasons: 
first, because Disclosure Laws are in fact ineffective public health measures; and 
second, because they inappropriately employ criminal condemnation as a 
response to a public health issue. The second fails for overbreadth. Disclosure 
Laws cover too much low-risk or essentially no-risk conduct to support the 
materiality of serostatus as a matter of law, and hence are not justified in what they 
actually require: a legal duty for PLWH to disclose serostatus in all cases. 
Considered from either the Public Health or the Sexual Autonomy perspective, 
broad HIV Disclosure Laws are unjustified. 
 
 117.  HIV Risk Behaviors, supra note 22. 
 118.  Buchanan, supra note 30, at 1342. 
